Like Biafra Like Iran

Following up on my last Sunday’s reflection on the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, I wish to, this week, dwell on how the current agitation for a state of Biafra, especially in the context of the activities of the Nnamdi Kanu-led Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), bears some resemblance to the Iranian regime’s fanatical pursuit of Islamist nationalism even when this is proving obviously too costly for the security and economic wellbeing of its populace.

My observation in that article is that if what Iran desires is the realization of its national interest – I mean interest that is truly concrete, such as economic and security goals, and not merely symbolic or prestigious – its combative intervention in the Israel-Palestine dispute is bad diplomacy born of privileging of ideology over substance. The creation and continued existence of the modern state of Israel since 1948 does not have any direct impact on Iran’s interest as a nation, be it in relation to trade, natural resources, defence etc. So, its intervention, which has seen it spend billions of dollars arming and training belligerent groups in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and attracting hostility from Israel and the west, is, therefore, a mere mission in pursuit of naked ideology. Thus, it is safe to say that its citizens do not deserve the pangs, deaths, and destruction which this clearly un-pragmatic diplomacy is attracting to them. Iran is not the only nation that has sided with the Palestinians in their territorial conflict with Israel, but its approach stands out given that it is the only one that, till date, maintains the policy of not recognizing Israel’s right to exist – a policy it has affirmed in a United Nations document (see the Law on Treaty). This attitude is a strong testimony for Iran’s deep-seated commitment to an ultra-conservative ideology it adopted since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

In the case of Biafra agitation, we are seeing something that strikes a similar chord of ideological obstinacy. The Biafra agitation has become something to be pursued irrespective of how costly and unrealistic it is proving to be. That ideology has given room for heinous criminality executed in its name – whether by genuine agitators or impostors. Its sit-at-home strategy has, before our very eyes, wrought economic disruptions, interrupted school activities, impeded free movements, and generally heightened insecurity. In spite of all these losses, we are yet to see any sign of the promised land of Biafra arriving any soon. Yet its protagonists want all of us to keep holding on to this ideology – the sort of ideological fanaticism seen with the Islamic regime of Iran.

Now, think about this: many people have cried out about the insecurity that always comes with the sit-at-home exercise but sympathisers of the strategy would always argue that sit-at-home itself is not the problem, that it is criminals that are merely taking advantage of an otherwise harmless situation. Some have even blamed the government for being behind the killings and property destructions as a way of discrediting IPOB and its agitations. However, common sense dictates that when your strategy becomes counter-productive by providing an opportunity for criminals to wreck havoc and allowing your enemy to discredit your ideology and purpose, the time for a change of strategy has indeed come. So, assuming that these defensive allegations by the IPOB and its sympathisers are true, their continued use and support for the sit-at-home strategy is tantamount to insensitive pursuit of ideology, sacrifice of common good on the altar of ideology – the same thing Iran may be accused of. Ideally, ideology should serve and not sabotage common good; otherwise one would be pursuing ideology for no reasonable cause – ideology for ideology sake.

Some IPOB sympathisers have repeatedly argued that whatever pains coming from sit-at-home exercises should be rightly seen as an inevitable sacrifice Igbo people should endure in their struggle for freedom. This argument labours in the face of the obvious truth that sit-at-home as a strategy does not appear efficient enough to advance the cause being pursued. It has proven not to be a product of brilliant strategizing as can be seen from its failure to force the hand of government years after it has been consistently applied. If it was meant to serve as a civil disobedience measure, it has proven to be misguided. Petty traders and owners of private businesses are disobeying no one by choosing to close their places of business. Government workers who do not go to work on such days are either held back by fear of insecurity or are merely taking advantage of the situation to lazy about or attend to personal matters – this is dependent on whether one lives in a place where there is still genuine fear of insecurity or in those places where such fear has sufficiently subsided. Can anyone confidently assert that poor petty traders in rural areas who rely on daily income for their daily bread but stay at home on such days are doing so out of enthusiasm for Biafra? The fact that many are still doing this in many places even after Kanu himself has declared that it should no longer be observed is clear evidence that its observance had strictly never been in obedience to him, but for fear of insecurity. (Instructively, it took the repatriation and detention of Kanu for him to order the stoppage of what he started and which harmful consequences many had for years lamented to no avail. I see his latter-day peace-leaning messages as not genuine; they totally contradict his persistently inciting and belligerent tone when he was broadcasting from his safe haven on the far-away British aisles.)

On the basis of all this, it is clear that the sit-at-home exercise is an impotent strategy that only ends up as self-harm. Just as Iran’s strategy of spending billions of dollars to arm belligerents has failed to deter Israel’s aggression or achieve a reasonable balance of terror but only fetching it crippling economic sanctions and ravaging bombs, the IPOB’s sit-at-home strategy is neither bringing Biafra closer or bettering the fortune of the Igbo – rather it is further destroying the race. Thus, any suggestion that the negative consequences of the sit-at-home exercise are a necessary sacrifice for a better future is indeed suspect.

This is the same scenario when Iran is telling its citizens that they have to endure the pains coming from western sanctions and Israeli-American military aggression for a greater Iran. What will be the real-time benefit to an average Iranian if Israel ceases to exist or if Palestinians reclaim the entire territory they lost following the creation of the modern state of Israel and the Six Days War? How will the life of an average Iranian be bettered if the Houthi regime their government is sponsoring in Yemen prevails against the internationally recognized government of that country? Or, on the other hand, have average Iranians lost anything since the Tehran-backed Assad regime in Syria fell? The answer appears to be No. If so, what will they lose if the other political and belligerent entities their government is sponsoring cease to exist? Indeed this is the sort of illogicality you get when an ideology is pursued for its own sake. Iran under multiple economic sanctions and persistent bombings would never offer a better life for citizens than one without sanctions and bombings – two consequences of stubborn pursuit of ideology.

In the case of Biafra agitations, its basis is admittedly compelling indeed – coming against the backdrop of a Nigeria that has perennially failed to work coupled with the historical cries of marginalization and injustice that have undermined state legitimacy. Nonetheless, the argument is this: no matter what the problem is, insisting on a strategy that shows no sign of solving it while further worsening your plight is tantamount to pursuit of ideology for its own sake.

POSTSCRIPTS: As I completed this write-up, news filtered in that the second crew member of the downed US F-15 fighter has been rescued around midnight Iranian time. Iran’s claim that the operation was foiled is unconvincing – the only way to prove that the elements of the US special forces that came for the rescue did not depart with the downed airman is to capture him dead or alive and show the images to the world. Any keen reader of military literature would understand the extreme risk and complexity of what is known in military parlance as combat search and rescue (CSAR) operation. It involves extracting a stranded personnel from a hostile territory, a task that demands an extremely high degree of tactical sophistication and hardware capability. The US was able to pull two such operations right inside Iran within 24 hours demonstrating its vast military superiority over the Persian state. This is more so given that Iran was anticipating the operation and yet couldn’t stop it when it came. This further strengthens my argument in last Sunday’s article that confrontational diplomacy, especially in military context, should be a no-no for Iran in its engagement with the Jewish-western alliance.

Henry Chigozie Duru teaches journalism and mass communication at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria.