Away from the role of the United States and Israel, let me now focus on Iran, another actor with decisive influence on the trajectory of the Middle East crisis.
To begin with, I think Iran must rethink its strategy in a number of ways. First, its extremist policy of not recognizing Israel’s right to exist is repugnant to both law and morality and must end. While Iran adopted this policy in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution, other countries like Egypt and Jordan that first upheld the same policy have since officially reversed it. On the contrary, Iran has been adamant; years ago, its former president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, controversially re-echoed the country’s desire to “wipe Israel out of the map.” Holding on to this extremist policy can explain why the Iranian state has been quite decisive in offering support to radical groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamist militants in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen as against more moderate entities like the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Now that Israel has devastatingly degraded the two frontline groups – Hamas and Hezbollah – the wisest step for Iran should be to explore a peace-focused, diplomatic strategy as against moving to rearm and reorganize these groups. The latter would only leave room for recurrence of face-offs between Israel and these groups with the possibility that things may degenerate to a direct confrontation between the Jewish state and the Persian state, as the most recent events have demonstrated.
Iran has a compelling motivation to desist from its confrontational diplomacy; it is a much weaker force militarily vis-à-vis the Jewish state, especially in its alliance with America. While Iran is a formidable force in terms of missiles and drones, its arsenal is generally inferior to that of Israel. Apart from its access to American funding and weaponry, the Jewish state is one of the world’s most technologically advanced nations, and this has reflected in its defence capabilities. Its weapon systems are powered by cutting-edge electronics and artificial intelligence, making them some of the most sophisticated in the world. Iran cannot match these in foreseeable future. Then, as was clearly demonstrated in its two weeks conflict with Israel, Iran’s air power is next to nothing when juxtaposed with that of Israel. None of its largely outdated airplanes was in action to counter Israel’s air assault executed with some of the most efficient aircraft the world has seen, including the elite US-built F-35 stealth fighters. To put it straight, while Iran has no air power for modern warfare, the Jewish state has the most advanced air force in the Middle East and one of the best in the world. In terms of intelligence to support a war, the two weeks conflict, as well as the preceding events, has shown that Israel holds the ace, and decisively so.
I have taken time to do the above military comparison between Iran and Israel simply to advance my point that Iran’s strategy is self-defeating. In the world of diplomacy, there are other means of pursuing one’s interest as against seeking confrontations with a stronger rival. In the study of international relations, three parameters have become popular for determining the stronger between two nations. These parameters can be framed as questions thus: Which of the two nations is more capable of influencing the policies and preferences of the other? Which of them is more able to wage war or withstand aggression from the other? And which of the nations is more capable of realising its strategic objectives against the other? Clearly, the answer, in the three cases, will be Israel-US alliance.
Against this backdrop, insisting on its confrontational approach would amount to bad diplomacy on the part of Iran. It should look at countries like Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE, and copy their more creative approach that has not only served the cause of peace, but has benefitted the countries themselves. For instance, Egypt and Jordan, which were once sworn enemies of Israel, accepted peace deals with the Jewish state as brokered by the US, and this entitled them to some incentives. Egypt, for example, struck its own agreement by way of the historic Camp David Accord brokered by President Jimmy Carter, and this gave them $1bn worth of defence aid yearly from the US. President Trump is offering Iran $30bn aid for development of a peaceful nuclear programme if it would give up its suspected atomic weapons project. It would also have economic sanctions lifted on it.
One may argue that the above suggestion amounts to asking Iran and the Palestinian people to submit to the Israeli-American hegemony; in fact, to accept defeat. Far from that, it is merely a call for embrace of pragmatism. Iran’s strategy of arming militant groups against Israel can never succeed in achieving balance of power between Israel and Palestine which would have made it possible for the two parties to negotiate on equal terms. Israel will always have some advantage on such negotiation table. This is a sad reality that must be accepted by anyone desiring of seeing a negotiated solution to the problem. If Iran accepts this, it will see reasons to change its strategy.
Iran’s approach is the major reason for Israel’s security fears. These fears have succeeded in making the much desired two-state solution more and more far-fetched. It has succeeded in relegating the more moderate and peace-focused Palestinian National Authority (PNA) while strengthening the role of radical and violent-poised entities like Hamas and Hezbollah. All this greatly undermines peaceful settlement.
Besides, Iran is being unfair to its citizens if it continues to be confrontational against a stronger adversary. It has a very slim chance of winning a full blown war against Israel, and when the United States is brought into the mix, the end is already clear from the beginning. Second, Iran does not have any direct and concrete strategic interest in the Palestine affair to justify exposing its citizens to perils of war as a result of its intervention. Given the grave ramifications of war, nations are not always too quick to jump into a war when the outcome will have no substantial bearing on their interest, and especially where it is a war they are not likely to win.
The “just war theory” in moral philosophy and theology recognizes having a concrete and self-survival-related interest as well as a good chance of victory as two of the criteria for judging if a nation’s participation in a war is justified. Going into a war when such interest is absent or tenuous and when there is a very slim chance of victory is a grave injustice to one’s nation and citizens who would bear the cost. It contradicts the principle of JUS IN BELLO (justice in war) – as philosophers and theologians would say. The Lord Jesus counselled against rushing into a war when chances of victory are small when he said, “Or suppose a king is about to go to war against another king. Won’t he first sit down and consider whether he is able with ten thousand men to oppose the one coming against him with twenty thousand? If he is not able, he will send a delegation while the other is still a long way off and will ask for terms of peace” (Luke 14:31-32, New International Version).
One last but very consequential action Iran must take is to drop its nuclear weapon ambitions. Its suspected nuclear arms programme is a key element fueling tensions and making the two-state solution an increasingly unattractive option for Israel. Though Iran has been denying this accusation of pursuing atomic armament, its continuous enrichment of uranium (now to up to 60 percent) makes its claims very suspicious. Peaceful use of uranium (for electricity generation) does not require enrichment beyond 3.5 percent . Enrichment for up to 60 percent means that Iran just needs to do 30 percent more to make a warhead.
Under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is obligated by international law not to develop a nuclear weapon. It can only do this if it pulls out of the treaty like North Korea did in 2003. However, unlike North Korea, Iran pulling out of the treaty would have grave consequences, as this would seem a conclusive confirmation that it is pursuing nuclear armament, thus prompting more desperate actions from the likes of the US and Israel.
To be sure, a nuclear-armed Iran will not be good for the Middle East. This will increase tensions, and likely trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, especially as Iran’s arch-rival, Saudi Arabia, would seriously consider achieving balance of power. Thus, a pragmatic approach to the pursuit of Middle East peace would require that Iran decisively clears all the doubts about its nuclear programme. Its continued enrichment of uranium and the accusation by the UN Atomic energy watchdog, the IAEA, that it is not cooperating with its inspectors as required under the NPT do not help matters at all.
On a personal note, I don’t think I am very comfortable with a nuclear-armed Iran given Iran’s policy of supporting radical non-state actors. While it is unlikely that Iran would give its nuclear arms to any of these groups, the optics of a nuclear-armed state courting the likes of Hezbollah and Islamist militants in Iraq is scary and not good for international tranquility. Besides, I’m not so comfortable with Iran’s internal political set-up, where an Islamic clerical dictatorship has been suppressing dissents since 1979. The recent clampdown on protests against forceful wearing of hijabs is instructive evidence of how precarious and fragile the Persian state’s politics may have become. This fuels the fear that it may be a matter of time before a possible implosion that could get the entire set-up crumbling. If this happens in an Iran that possesses nuclear stockpiles, may God save the world if the weapons get into the wrong hands. The case of Libya post-Gaddafi where thousands of light arms fell into the hands of non-state actors and across the borders is still a fresh example.
I am of the strong view that Iran should enter into a deal that will finally end the entire nuclear brouhaha. Lifting of Western sanctions and obtaining of $30bn peaceful nuclear energy aid from the US – two incentives that have been offered to it – should be an enough motivation to take this course. Otherwise, Iran, Israel and the world would continue on that vicious circle that leads to nowhere.
Achieving peace in Middle East requires pragmatism. Iran does not have a super power status, and so its confrontational posture against the Israeli-western alliance can only produce endless conflicts as against balance of power that would have birthed negotiations on equal terms. This is a sad truth in an international arena where might, and not law or morality, justifies actions. This point was made clearly in the first part of this article where I cited John Locke’s observation that the sphere of international politics is still governed by the lawlessness of the “state of nature.” Had Iran been as strong as, for instance, Russia, it would have been a different case; its confrontational approach could have resulted to a different outcome. But since the reverse is the case, it must rethink its strategy.
CONCLUDED
Henry Chigozie Duru, PhD, teaches journalism and mass communication at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria.
Thanks again for the analysis.